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Abstract
This paper analyses and quantiﬁes the eﬀects of trade liberalisation and
skill-biased technical change, both exogenous and trade-induced, on the skill
premium and real wages of unskilled and skilled workers in the Mexican man-
ufacturing sector, using industry- and ﬁrm-level data for 1984-1990 from the
Encuesta Industrial Anual. The novelty of the paper lies in its strategy for
identifying causality, which uses diﬀerences across industries over time in the
relative price of machinery and equipment in the US as an instrument for
skill-biased technical change. The eﬀect of trade-induced SBTC on wages,
and especially on wage inequality, appears substantial. The regressions show
that trade liberalisation and changes in the relative price of equipment in
the US, which induce exogenous SBTC in Mexico, explain one quarter of
the increase in relative skilled wages between 1984 and 1990. This rise in
the skill premium due to SBTC and trade liberalisation mainly reﬂect a rise
in real skilled wages, although with some speciﬁcations it was ampliﬁed by
a fall in the real wages of unskilled workers.
Keywords: trade liberalisation, skill-biased technical change, wage inequal-
ity, real wages, Mexico, manufacturing.
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CSAE WPS/2010-281 Introduction
The last 25 years have witnessed an increase in wage inequality not only in devel-
oped countries, but also in some low-income and many middle-income developing
countries. This increase in wage inequality – more speciﬁcally a rise in the mean
wage of skilled workers relative to the mean wage of unskilled workers – mainly
reﬂect a rise in real skilled wages, although in some countries it was ampliﬁed by
a stagnation or a fall in the real wages of unskilled workers (see Anderson, 2005;
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).
Two other changes during this period have been linked by economists to this
increase in relative skilled wages. First, many developing countries have become
more integrated with the rest of world, particularly through reductions in tariﬀ
rates, quotas and other non-tariﬀ barriers. The rising relative wages of skilled
workers in developing countries are at odds with the prediction usually made from
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, based on the assumption that developing countries
are abundant in unskilled labour. Wood (1997), however, points out that Latin
American countries, in many of which the rise in the skill premium was marked,
were relatively skill abundant when they opened to trade in the 1980s.
Second, since most of the world’s technical progress originates in a few rich
countries (Schmidt, 2010), which are relatively skill abundant, machinery and
equipment, hereafter M&E, tends to be complementary to skill (Ria˜ no, 2009).
When new technologies, such as personal computers, are adopted by ﬁrms in de-
veloping countries, they are thus likely to increase the relative demand for skilled
workers, a process that has been referred to in the literature as (exogenous) skill-
biased technical change, hereafter SBTC (see Acemoglu, 2002a;b).
2While there is still debate about the relative importance of trade liberalisation
and SBTC as causes of the rise in the skill premium in developed countries, a com-
bined hypothesis to explain outcomes in developing countries has been suggested
by Acemoglu (2002a; 2003) and analysed further in several recent papers (Caselli,
2010; Burstein and Vogel, 2009; Bustos, 2009; Ria˜ no, 2009; Schmidt, 2010). These
authors have suggested that when a developing country reduces its barriers to
trade, ﬁrms are able to import new technology embodied in M&E at a lower price,
which induces the adoption of skill-biased technologies. Thus, trade liberalisa-
tion can raise the skill premium even in skill-scarce developing countries, a process
which can be referred to as trade-induced or endogenous SBTC. Acemoglu (2002b)
also suggests that SBTC can be induced by other forms of openness, such as for-
eign direct investment (FDI) inﬂows, and other characteristics of the economy,
such as labour market institutions.
This paper explores the eﬀects of trade liberalisation and SBTC, both exoge-
nous and trade-induced, on the skill premium and real wages of unskilled and
skilled workers in the Mexican manufacturing sector. The data used are at indus-
try and ﬁrm level, cover the period 1984-1990, and come mainly from the Encuesta
Industrial Anual, Annual Manufacturing Survey, conducted by the Instituto Na-
cional de Estadist´ ıca y Geograf´ ıa (INEGI). The novelty of the paper lies in the new
identiﬁcation strategy applied to infer causality, based on Leonardi (2007) and the
model developed by Caselli (2010), and is enhanced by its focus on both real and
relative wages.
Caselli (2010) builds a model of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms ` a
la Melitz (2003). It extends the model by Vannoorenberghe (2008) to two sectors
that diﬀer in terms of their intensity in the use of skilled and unskilled labour and
3two countries, North and South, as in Bernard et al. (2007). It includes imported
M&E as a third factor of production. M&E is modelled as complementary to skilled
workers and substitutable for unskilled workers (see Krusell et al., 2000). This
framework makes it possible to study the diﬀerent eﬀects of trade liberalisation on
wages identiﬁed by Bernard et al. (2007), i.e. Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects, increase in
product variety and endogenous industry-level productivity gains. Additionally, it
analyses new eﬀects due to ﬁrm heterogeneity in the productivity of skilled workers
(see Vannoorenberghe, 2008) and equipment-skill complementarity.
Decreases in the price of imported M&E due to reductions in tariﬀs or in its
international price lead to an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers,
the complementary factor in production, especially in more productive ﬁrms that
employ relatively more skilled workers and M&E. In turn, this leads to increases
in the real wages of skilled workers, while unskilled workers may gain or lose
depending on the type of variable trade costs assumed. This implies that, even
if unskilled labour is the abundant factor of production and therefore Stolper-
Samuelson eﬀects push the skill premium downwards, this new eﬀect leads to
overall increases in skilled workers’ real wages and in wage inequality following
trade liberalisation.
Caselli (2010) also shows that the increase in the demand for skilled workers
by more productive ﬁrms is reﬂected in increased in the variance across ﬁrms in
each sector of the ratio between M&E and unskilled labour, a proxy for SBTC
(see Leonardi, 2007).1 However, increases in this variance can be associated with
other changes too, which are not related to SBTC and accompanied by increases
1For simplicity, the model assumes a Leontief technology with perfect complementarity be-
tween skilled labour and M&E. This implies that SBTC causes larger increases in the variance
of the equipment-unskilled labour ratio than in the variance of the equipment-labour ratio.
4in the relative demand for skilled labour and relative skilled wages.
Based on this model, it is possible to design an empirical strategy to explain
the increase in the relative demand for skilled labour and, consequently, in the skill
premium that has been observed in Mexican manufacturing between 1984 and 1990
by several papers, including Ria˜ no (2009) and the present one. This paper uses
variation across industries over time in the price of M&E relative to the consumer
price index in the US as an instrument for exogenous SBTC in the analysis of
Mexican labour market dynamics and thus avoids some of the problems faced by
earlier work in arguing for a causal impact of trade liberalisation and technical
change on wages.
This identiﬁcation strategy relies on factor immobility across industries, an
assumption supported by the descriptive evidence presented. The paper shows
that a reduction in the relative price of M&E in the US translates into a reduction
in the relative price of M&E in Mexico because of the latter’s historic dependency
on US M&E and technology. Lower input tariﬀs are shown to have a similar
negative eﬀect on the relative price of M&E in Mexico. In turn, lower prices lead
to increased use of M&E by Mexican ﬁrms, especially by more productive ﬁrms,
and, given the complementarity, an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labour. This shows up in the data as an increase in the within-industry variance
of the equipment-labour ratio, which is used as a proxy for SBTC. After controlling
for other time-variant industry and economy-wide characteristics, the paper shows
that the higher variance in the equipment-labour ratio leads to increases in the
skill premium and the real wages of skilled workers, thus providing evidence for
trade-induced SBTC.
The results also reveal that lower output tariﬀ rates increase the skill premium,
5which highlights the distinctive role of output tariﬀs compared to input tariﬀs in
wage determination (Amiti and Konings, 2007). This result also suggests that
trade liberalisation had an eﬀect in Mexico in the 1980s similar to what would be
predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for a country relatively abundant in
skilled labour, as argued by Wood (1997). However, while the arguments in Wood
(1997) are based on a HOS model and, therefore, factor mobility across industries
within a country, the data show that a speciﬁc-factor model with immobile labour
would be more realistic for such a short time period. Therefore, this paper will
explain the positive eﬀect of trade liberalisation on the skill premium using a
speciﬁc-factor framework.
In order to argue that trade liberalisation has a causal impact on relative
and real skilled wages through induced SBTC, the instrument used needs to be
informative and valid. While the empirical analysis reveals that the instrumental
variable (IV) approach is informative, the paper relies on Leonardi (2007) and the
framework developed in Caselli (2010) to argue the validity of the instrument. In
terms of the magnitude of the estimated eﬀects, SBTC and trade liberalisation can
explain one quarter of the overall increase in the skill premium during the period
1984-1990 and most of this is due to SBTC, both exogenous and trade-induced.
The instrument used in this paper, i.e. the relative price of M&E in the US, is
at the 3-digit industry level and, thus, the above results are based on regressing
average industry wages on a set of explanatory variables measured at the industry
level, including tariﬀ rates and the instrumented proxy for SBTC. However, the
paper also shows results based on regressing real and relative wages at plant level
on both plant- and industry-level variables. In these regressions, it is possible to
study the impact of SBTC on wages by including the instrumented within-industry
6variance of the equipment-labour ratio or more standard plant-level measures of
SBTC, such as royalties paid on new technologies and M&E imports (see the
literature review by Chennells and Van Reenen, 1999). The unit of observation in
the dataset used is a plant rather than a ﬁrm, which poses problems of identiﬁcation
because ﬁrms may re-organise production among the plants they own. However,
the plant-level results in general seem to conﬁrm the ﬁndings at the industry level.
Mexico has been frequently chosen as a country in which to study the eﬀects
of trade liberalisation on wages. Not only did the country go through a substan-
tial trade liberalisation process, with production-weighted average tariﬀs declining
from 28.5 percent in 1985 to 12.5 percent in 1990 (Ten Kate, 1992) and trade as a
fraction of GDP rising from 20 percent in 1980 to 55 percent in 1995, but also the
skill premium increased by almost 30 percent between 1985 and 1994, remaining
stable afterwards (Ria˜ no, 2009).
A limitation of most previous work on the liberalisation process in Mexico is
its focus only on wage inequality, neglecting real wages. Another limitation is its
reliance on the HOS model and one of its corollaries, the Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem (Hanson and Harrison, 1999; Feliciano, 2001; Esquivel and Rodr´ ıguez-L´ opez,
2003), which have met some criticism. Hanson and Harrison (1999) argue that the
increase in the skill premium can be explained using a HOS framework because
the pattern of tariﬀs before liberalisation was such that unskilled-labour-intensive
industries were more protected. Esquivel and Rodr´ ıguez-L´ opez (2003) instead use
Leamer (1998)’s methodology, which also relies on perfect mobility of all factors
across industries, and, in contrast to previous studies, ﬁnd that trade has tended
to reduce relative skilled wages, while skill-biased technical change tended to raise
them. However, none of these studies based on the ‘mandated wage’ approach
7ﬁnds strong evidence for the channel through which the Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem works in theory, since the correlation between changes in output prices and
relative wages at the industry level is extremely low (Ria˜ no, 2009).
Other studies have investigated alternative possible causal connections between
greater openness and the increase in wage inequality. Among them, Feenstra
and Hanson (1997) argue that FDI towards maquiladoras, assembly plants for
re-exports, has been the cause of the increase in relative skilled wages after the
trade liberalisation of 1985-1987, and Verhoogen (2008) shows that new export
opportunities following the 1994 Mexican peso devaluation led to an increase in
within-industry wage inequality due to quality upgrading by the most eﬃcient
plants.
Two other papers study the links between trade and technology adoption and
are, therefore, more closely related to Caselli (2010). Ria˜ no (2009) develops and
estimates a structural model of trade and technology adoption with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. Firms produce using skilled and unskilled labour and can choose between
two technologies: a ‘traditional’ technology characterised by high marginal costs
but low ﬁxed costs, and a ‘modern’ technology that has low marginal costs but
high ﬁxed costs. By identifying plants that purchase imported M&E as using the
modern technology, the author estimates the response of technology adoption and
the skill premium to a unilateral trade liberalisation of a similar magnitude to the
one that took place in Mexico after 1985. In the baseline model, he ﬁnds that
trade liberalisation leads to an increase in the relative demand for skills and an
increase in the skill premium of around 2.4 percent. Allowing for the reduced sunk
cost of technology adoption due to the falling import tariﬀs, the impact of trade
liberalisation on the skill premium is stronger, raising it by 4.2 percent. Ria˜ no’s
8model is similar to Bustos (2009), except that the latter model is static, assumes
that skilled and unskilled labour are perfect complements in production and does
not allow for the possibility of cheaper technology due to falling import tariﬀs.
However, while in these two papers there are only two technologies characterised
by a trade-oﬀ between ﬁxed and marginal cost, Caselli (2010) uses a continuous
measure of technology adoption that allows larger and more productive ﬁrms to
expand further in size, even though all ﬁrms upgrade their skills and technology
to a degree.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the Mexi-
can liberalisation process in the 1980s. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data used and
provide some descriptive evidence of an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labour between 1984 and 1990. Section 5 outlines the identiﬁcation strategy and
the econometric speciﬁcation. This section explains why the relative price of M&E
in the US can be used as an instrument for SBTC in a ﬁrst-stage regression and
how SBTC is measured. Section 6 presents the results of the regression analysis.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Mexico’s trade policy in the 1980s
This section describes the main characteristics of the programme of trade liber-
alisation introduced in Mexico in the period 1985-1987 and demonstrates that
the Mexican government was committed during this period to trade liberalisation
encompassing all industries. Several detailed accounts can be found of this trade
reform, one of the most far-reaching of any developing economy (see, among others,
Ten Kate, 1989; 1992).
9During the import substitution phase of the late 1950s to the late 1970s three
main forms of trade controls were applied: ad valorem import tariﬀs, oﬃcial mini-
mum prices for customs valuation and a system of quantity restrictions in the form
either of quotas or of licensing. It is generally agreed that the most restrictive el-
ement of the Mexican import regime was the system of quantity restrictions. A
recurrent policy of the Mexican government, when it was experiencing a lack of
foreign exchange, was to reintroduce import controls and alter the exchange rate,
rather than reducing domestic expenditure (Ten Kate, 1992).
However, in the early 1980s pressures mounted for the liberalisation of trade.
After the oil boom of the late 1970s, Mexico relied almost exclusively for foreign
exchange on crude oil export earnings and borrowing. Therefore, it is no surprise
that in the early 1980s, after the weakening of the oil market and the sharp increase
in interest rates in the US, the Mexican economy was in a diﬃcult situation. The
balance-of-payments crisis led to a collapse of the peso, bank runs and a deep
recession as well as to the reversal of the modest trade liberalization attempts
of the late 1970s. Therefore, the Mexican government turned to radical trade
liberalisation, exchange rate devaluation, privatisation of state-owned companies
and a more tolerant attitude towards private foreign investments. This recipe was
also part of the Baker Plan and the structural adjustment programmes proposed
at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in
Seoul in October 1985.
The ambitious unilateral trade liberalisation programme was launched in July
1985. In a relatively brief period, tariﬀ rates on most products were reduced,
reference prices were progressively removed and non-tariﬀ controls were drastically
decreased or eliminated, as can be seen in Table 1. Licenses were eliminated
10Table 1: Protection measures for Mexican manufacturing in the 1980s
1985 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Jun Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec
Production-weighted tariﬀ averages 23.5 28.5 24.5 11.8 10.2 12.5
Domestic production value covered
by import licensing 92.2 47.1 39.8 25.4 21.3 19.8
Domestic production value covered
by oﬃcial import prices 18.7 25.4 18.7 0.6 0.0 0.0
Source: Ten Kate (1992).
for almost 3600 tariﬀ lines, which left only 908 under control, while the license
coverage decreased from 92.2 to 47.1 percent between July and December 1985
and reached 25.4 percent by December 1987. Initially, to compensate for the
protection lost with the elimination of licenses, production-weighted tariﬀ averages
were increased from 23.5 to 28.5 percent, but by December 1987 they had fallen to
11.8 percent, with the initial tariﬀ cuts concentrated on intermediate and capital
goods (Ten Kate, 1992). At the same time, the domestic production value covered
by oﬃcial import prices was reduced to virtually zero by December 1987, down
from 18.7 percent in July 1985, to comply with Mexico’s membership of GATT
from July 1986.
Mexico’s accession to the GATT did not imply an intensiﬁcation of the liberali-
sation process but should rather be considered as a signal by policy makers of their
intention to continue the liberalisation process (Ten Kate, 1992). A further simpli-
ﬁcation and ﬁne-tuning of the tariﬀ structure was carried out after the enactment
of the Economic Solidarity Pact in 1987, in which the government, business or-
ganisations and trade unions agreed to promote macroeconomic stabilisation and
a speeding-up of trade reform in the hope that stiﬀer competition from abroad
would help to reduce inﬂation. The emphasis was on reducing the dispersion in
tariﬀ rates with the objective of producing a broadly uniform system of eﬀective
11protection, which led to further reductions in production-weighted average tariﬀs
to 10.2 percent, license coverage to 21.3 percent and production value covered by
oﬃcial import prices to zero by December 1988. The process of trade liberalisation
advanced further when Mexico jointly with the US and Canada signed the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in December of 1992, which came into
eﬀect on January 1st of 1994.
These trade reforms had a large impact on the pattern of trade in Mexico. The
volume of trade has increased signiﬁcantly since 1985 and, in particular, non-oil
exports rose threefold in value between 1981 and 1990. Coupled with a decrease in
the relative price of petroleum, this led to a decline in petroleum’s share of exports
from 75 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 1990. At the same time, the importance
of the US as a trading partner has become more pronounced as Mexico’s share of
trade with the US rose from 56 percent in 1982 to 70 percent in 1992 (Ria˜ no, 2009).
The exchange rate depreciation was reversed after 1987 with the consequence of
an increase in imports, which contributed to more competition from abroad as
advocated by Mexican policy-makers to ﬁght inﬂation (Ten Kate, 1992).
3D a t a
The data used in this paper come mainly from the Encuesta Industrial Anual
(Annual Industrial Survey, EIA), provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadist´ ıca
yG e o g r a f ´ ıa, INEGI, the national institute of statistics of Mexico. The database
contains information on 3218 manufacturing plants for the period 1984-1990 (for
a total of 22526 plant-year observations) and it is by design a balanced panel that
covers roughly 80 percent of all manufacturing value-added. The data distinguish
12Table 2: Descriptive statistics
1985 1990
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Skill premium (ratio of ws/wu) 1.94 0.28 2.63 0.44
Real skilled wages (1994 pesos per day) 117.30 23.45 125.10 32.29
Real unskilled wages (1994 pesos per day) 63.42 11.48 50.08 11.04
Tariﬀ rate on ﬁnal goods 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.03
Tariﬀ rate on inputs 0.23 0.09 0.12 0.03
Variance of equipment-labour ratio (× 10000) 0.74 1.59 1.38 6.25
Relative price of M&E (Mexico) 1.31 0.09 1.21 0.12
Relative price of M&E (US) (× 10) 1.68 0.08 1.62 0.05
Royalties paid (1994 pesos) (× 1000) 17.59 80.25 32.77 249.89
M&E imports (1994 pesos) (× 1000)2 38.12 377.21 81.32 521.79
129 industries, classiﬁed according to the CMAE75 (Clasiﬁcaci´ on Mexicana de
Actividades Econ´ omicas, 1975). Omitted from the data are plants with missing
information on the employment and wage bill of production and non-production
workers, some odd observations, entrants and exiters because by construction this
is supposed to be a balanced panel and incomplete series (for more information on
the EIA and the cleaning procedure see Iacovone, 2008 and Ria˜ no, 2009). Firms
belonging to the oil production sector are also eliminated because this sector is
controlled by the government. The ﬁnal sample contains 16891 observations, that
is, 2413 per year. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of some of the variables
included in the analysis for 1985 and 1990.
This database provides a wide array of information on each individual plant,
including information on the total number of blue-collar (or production) workers,
whose main activities include machine operation, production supervision, repair,
maintenance and cleaning, and white-collar (or non-production) workers, such
as managers, administrators, professionals and salesmen, total number of hours
2The values of M&E imports for 1985 refer to 1986 because this is the ﬁrst year in which
information on imports and exports are collected in this survey.
13worked for each type of worker, total remuneration, production, input use, stock of
and investment in diﬀerent capital goods, including M&E imports, and exporting
status (from 1986 onwards). Therefore, this paper distinguishes between skilled
and unskilled workers on the basis of occupation rather than education. The
classiﬁcation of workers into production and non-production groups in order to
approximate skilled and unskilled labour respectively is not ideal because skills are
better described by classiﬁcations based on educational characteristics, as pointed
out by Gonzaga et al. (2006) and Bustos (2009). However, this categorisation is
v e r yc o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r e( B e r m a net al., 1994; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996;
Leamer, 1998; Meschi et al., 2009) because it is often the only one available in
ﬁrm-level data. Berman et al. (1994) also argue that it yields results similar to
those obtained using education categories.
From the information provided it is possible to extract the following variables
that will be used later in the analysis. Skilled wages are measured as the average
daily wages for non-production workers (ws), unskilled wages as the average daily
wages for production workers (wu) and the skill premium (wi), the measure of
wage inequality, as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. These factor prices are
deﬂated using diﬀerent consumer price indices depending on the level of the salary
to account for the fact that consumers buy diﬀerent goods in diﬀerent proportions
depending on their incomes (Broda and Romalis, 2008). In order to do this, data
from the Bank of Mexico on the inﬂation rate that diﬀerent income groups face
depending on their income is used and matched to the salaries of production and
non-production workers depending on their average sectoral wages. Four income
groups for the price indices are provided by the Bank of Mexico: people who earn
up until the minimum salary, those between 1 and 3 times the minimum salary,
14those between 3 and 6 times the minimum salary and, ﬁnally, those above 6 times
the minimum salary.
The EIA provides data on capital and its diﬀerent components, including M&E
imports, investment and capital stock, at the ﬁrm level. Each type of capital is
deﬂated using speciﬁc indices that diﬀer across sectors, provided by the INEGI.
Using this data and information on employment at the ﬁrm level, the ratio between
the capital stock of M&E and total labour is calculated for each ﬁrm and, in turn,
its variance across ﬁrms within the same industry is computed (varel). The within-
industry variance of the equipment-labour ratio is not the only proxy for SBTC
that is used in the regressions below. The ﬁrm-level regressions also use the amount
of money spent on royalties for the use of new technologies (royalties)a n dM & E
imports (eimp).
The output share of each ﬁrm in its industry (soutput) is also calculated us-
ing data from the EIA, together with the normalised Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
(nhhi), a measure of competitiveness at the industry level.3 The degree of union-
isation in an industry is calculated as the percentage of workers that belong to a
recognised trade union, taken from the National Survey on Household Income and
Spending (ENIGH) provided by the INEGI (union).
Production-weighted average tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods (taro) are taken from
Ten Kate (1989; 1992). These data, combined with input-output tables provided
by the INEGI, are used to calculate the production-weighted average tariﬀ rates
on inputs (tari). The relative price of M&E in Mexico is constructed as the ratio
of the price of M&E to the consumer price index and is also taken from the INEGI




k,i − 1/n)/(1 − 1/n), where soutputk,i is the share of ﬁrm k in industry i
and n is the number of ﬁrms in industry i.
15(pmex). The relative price of M&E in the US is constructed in the same way
with data taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (pus). The relative
prices of M&E in the US and in Mexico are not directly comparable because they
are constructed using non-comparable indices. All variables just described are
available at the 3-digit industry level.
The Encuesta Industrial Anual was also conducted between 1994 and 2003,
the period in which NAFTA was implemented. However, this additional data will
not be used in this paper for several reasons. Although Mexico liberalised trade
vis-` a-vis the US, average tariﬀ rates actually remained stable or increased slightly
during this period. The main reason is that NAFTA was designed in such a way
that most tariﬀ cuts, especially in protected industries, were delayed as long as
possible. This makes it diﬃcult to establish a link between tariﬀ rates on inputs
and the relative price of M&E and, in turn, with the within-industry variance in
equipment-labour ratios because there is not enough variability in these variables.
Therefore, a diﬀerent empirical strategy would need to be designed to estimate
the impact of trade-induced SBTC on wages, possibly one that used data directly
at the ﬁrm level. However, the full ﬁrm-level database of the Encuesta Industrial
Anual and the Encuesta Industrial Mensual, the Monthly Manufacturing Survey
that provides information on wage bills, employment and exports, is not readily
available due to statistical secrecy.
4 Descriptive evidence
Figure 1 plots the movement of relative skilled wages (left axis) and relative skilled
employment (right axis) during 1984-1990. The ﬁgure shows that both relative














































































1984 1986 1988 1990
Relative skilled wages Relative skilled employment
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
wages and relative employment tended to rise until 1988 – that is, during the rapid
trade liberalisation process. Although the increase in relative employment is much
more modest, this simultaneous increase in relative wages and relative employment
necessarily implies an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour (Meschi
et al., 2009). In the period 1988-1990, when tariﬀ rates increased slightly in all
sectors, there seems to be an inverse relationship between relative skilled wages
and employment. This pattern of relative wages and employment is also consistent
with an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour, while it is unlikely that
the increase in the relative supply of unskilled labour (see Atkin, 2010) played an
important role since the change in relative skilled employment is again small.
17Figure 2 plots the evolution of the wage bill share of skilled labour. This
variable can be also used to determine whether the relative demand for skilled
labour increased and, therefore, to distinguish the eﬀects of labour supply from
those of labour demand, under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labour is equal to one (Berman and Machin, 2000).4
If the elasticity of substitution is one, the wage bill share of skilled labour is
invariant to movements along the relative demand curve and, therefore, can be
considered a measure of the demand for skills (Meschi et al., 2009). The ﬁgure
shows that the wage bill share of skilled labour increased during this period and,
thus, conﬁrms the rising demand for skills.
While ﬁgure 1 plots average relative skilled wages, ﬁgure 3 analyses what hap-
pened between 1985 and 1990 to relative skilled wages in all 46 sectors. Similar
ﬁgures for skilled and unskilled real wages are provided in the Appendix. The
ﬁgure shows that there is a general tendency for relative skilled wages to increase
(all observations are above the 45-degree line that represents no change in rela-
tive wages between the two years), as observed in the previous ﬁgure and in table
2. However, in some industries relative wages increased by more than in oth-
ers and, through the econometric analysis described later, this paper will relate
these diﬀerential movements of wages across sectors to the shocks described ear-
lier, i.e. trade liberalisation and both exogenous and trade-induced SBTC. These
diﬀerential movements of wages also resulted in an increase in the variance and in
the coeﬃcient of variation, which can be calculated from table 2 as the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean. Figure 3 does not show whether the within-sector
4This value is considered to be a lower bound for the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labour (Acemoglu, 2002b; Behar, 2009).
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Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
increase in wages is due to a general increase in wages in all ﬁrms within a sector
or an increase in the within-sector variance of wages across ﬁrms. This issue will
be discussed in more detail as part of the robustness checks.
In order to make a ﬁrst attempt at understanding the main forces behind the
skill upgrading documented in the ﬁgures above, the aggregate changes in the
relative employment of skilled labour and in the wage bill share of skilled workers
will be split into their between- and within-industry components. Following Bustos
(2007) and Meschi et al. (2009), the aggregate increase in the demand for skills may
be driven by (a) employment reallocation across industries caused by a trade shift,
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Relative skilled wages in 1985
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
structural change, changing tastes, or changes in economic policy, or by (b) skill
upgrading within industries mainly due to technological change. The following
formulas are used to decompose the aggregate changes in the relative employment



































































20where the subscript j denotes 3-digit industries5, a Δ before a term denotes change
over time and a bar over a term denotes a mean over time. In both formulas, the
ﬁrst term is the between-industry component of skill upgrading, i.e. how much
bigger or smaller an industry becomes over time, weighted by time-averaged skill
demand. The second term measures the contribution of within-industry variations,
weighted by the relative size of industry j.
At the industry and at the aggregate level, the observed change in the demand
for skilled labour may reﬂect within-ﬁrm as well as between-ﬁrm variations and,
therefore, additional decompositions will be done to analyse changes due to their
between- and within-ﬁrm components. These decompositions will use the same
formulas as above, the only diﬀerence being that the subscript j will denote ﬁrms.
All decompositions will be done for the whole 1984-1990 period and for the 1984-
1988 and 1988-1990 sub-periods in order to relate the increase in the relative
demand for skilled labour more closely to the trade liberalisation process.
As observed in ﬁgure 1, table 3 shows that over the period 1984-1990 the relative
employment of skilled labour increased only by 0.4 percentage points. Since the
aggregate change in relative skilled employment is small, in the following analysis
this paper will mainly focus on the decomposition analysis of the wage bill share
of skilled workers. However, it is worth noting that both between- and within-
industry components of the aggregate change in relative employment of skilled
labour are positive and that 45 percent of the aggregate increase can be explained
by within-industry changes. While the positive between-industry variation implies
that there was a reallocation of resources towards more skill-intensive industries,
5The decomposition analysis is also available at diﬀerent levels of aggregation, i.e. 2-digit
and 4-digit industry level, but the additional tables are not included and discussed because the
results are similar to those using 3-digit industries.
21Table 3: Decomposition of changes in relative skilled employment
Between Within Total
1984-1990
Industries at 3-digit CMAE75 (46) 0.0022 0.0018 0.0040
Firms (2413) -0.0026 0.0066 0.0040
1984-1988
Industries at 3-digit CMAE75 (46) 0.0009 0.0167 0.0176
Firms (2413) -0.0018 0.0194 0.0176
1988-1990
Industries at 3-digit CMAE75 (46) 0.0011 -0.0147 -0.0136
Firms (2413) 0.0006 -0.0142 -0.0136
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
holding skill intensity within industries constant, the positive within-industry vari-
ation implies that skill intensity increased within industries, holding industry size
constant. When changes are disaggregated at the ﬁrm level, between-ﬁrm changes
are negative, meaning that there was a reallocation of resources towards skill-scarce
ﬁrms, while within-ﬁrm variation remains positive and accounts for 165 percent of
the overall variation.
Table 4 reports the between and within decompositions of the aggregate change
in the wage bill share of skilled labour. The wage bill share of skilled labour
increased by 6.8 percentage points between 1984 and 1990. This increase happened
during both sub-periods considered, i.e. 1984-1988 and 1988-1990, and with similar
magnitudes.
During all the periods analysed, both between- and within-industry changes
are positive and the within-industry changes explain most of the overall change by
accounting for about 90 percent of the variation. Moreover, most of this change is
explained by skill upgrading within ﬁrms. The lack of information on entry and
exit implies that the reallocations across industries and ﬁrms that occur through
these channels are missed in these calculations. However, since the balanced panel
22Table 4: Decomposition of changes in the wage bill share of skilled labour
Between Within Total
1984-1990
Industries at 3-digit CMAE75 (46) 0.0074 0.0604 0.0678
Firms (2413) 0.0162 0.0516 0.0678
1984-1988
Industries at 3-digit CMAE75 (46) 0.0043 0.0339 0.0382
Firms (2413) 0.0098 0.0284 0.0382
1988-1990
Industries at 3-digit CMAE75 (46) 0.0024 0.0272 0.0296
Firms (2413) 0.0058 0.0238 0.0296
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
represents 80 percent of manufacturing output, skill upgrading within industries
and ﬁrms was clearly an important source of the overall increase in the relative
demand for skilled labour and the skill premium.
The analysis of wage bills shows that not only did skill-intensive industries
and ﬁrms expand relative to less skill-intensive industries and ﬁrms, but also that
all industries and ﬁrms raised their skill intensity. If HOS theory were an accu-
rate description of the changes that occurred during this period and labour were
perfectly mobile, then within-industry changes would be equal to zero since real-
location would only happen between sectors. Moreover, according to HOS theory,
between-industry changes in the wage bill share of skilled labour should be neg-
ative for skill-scarce countries because, following trade liberalisation, the price of
less skill-intensive goods would increase relatively and, consequently, less skill-
intensive sectors would expand, leading to a decrease in the relative demand for
skilled labour.
The data tend to conﬁrm that, as argued by Wood (1997), Mexico was not an
unskilled labour abundant country in the 1980s, since between-industry changes
in the wage bill share of skilled labour are positive. However, it is also the case
23that between-industry variation accounts for only a small percentage of the ag-
gregate change, so that other explanations are needed to throw light upon the
small positive between-industry changes and the large positive within-industry
and within-ﬁrm changes.
An alternative theory for the large within-industry and within-ﬁrm changes oc-
curred in Mexico is trade liberalisation under the assumption of imperfect labour
mobility, as in a speciﬁc-factor model. If labour immobility were due to the
existence of sector-speciﬁc skills, then skilled labour would be less mobile than
unskilled labour. Moreover, if the country were skilled labour abundant, trade
opening would cause the prices of less skill-intensive goods to decrease and, conse-
quently, the sectoral structure of outputs would shift towards skill-intensive goods.
This would imply a small positive between-industry change, as observed in the case
of Mexico, because imperfect labour mobility would prevent a full reallocation of
labour across sectors.
In addition to these two hypotheses, trade could have contributed in other ways
to the increase in the relative demand for skilled labour. In particular, as shown by
the new trade models with ﬁrm heterogeneity following the seminal paper by Melitz
(2003), trade liberalisation may lead to within-industry resource reallocations since
more productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to scale up their production aimed at the
export market at the expense of less productive ﬁrms, which may drop out of
the market. If more productive ﬁrms used skilled workers more intensively, then
a reallocation of resources towards them would imply an increase in the relative
demand for skilled labour and positive within-industry changes. However, positive
within-industry changes in this case would be associated mainly with between-
ﬁrm changes because not all ﬁrms would increase their relative demand for skilled
24labour.
Another hypothesis to explain the large within-industry and within-ﬁrm changes
is SBTC. As new skill-biased technologies (i.e. M&E) are introduced, due to either
a decrease in their price on international markets or a decrease in tariﬀs on these
inputs, all ﬁrms and industries tend to increase their demand for skilled labour, al-
though possibly in diﬀerent magnitudes, resulting in positive within-industry and
within-ﬁrm variations.
When comparing these ﬁndings with those from other middle-income countries,
the most important diﬀerence is that in the case of Mexico the between-industry
component of the changes in relative skilled employment or in the wage bill share
of skilled labour are positive throughout the whole period. This is in contrast with
the ﬁndings of Gonzaga et al. (2006) for Brazil in 1988-1995, Bustos (2007) for
Argentina in 1992-1996 and Meschi et al. (2009) for Turkey in 1983-1988, which
show that these middle-income countries experienced negative between-industry
and -ﬁrm changes in the relative demand for skilled labour when they liberalised
trade. The present results resemble more closely the ﬁndings in Berman et al.
(1994) for the US, a high-income country relatively abundant in skilled labour.
On the other hand, the within-industry and within-ﬁrm components of the ag-
gregate change in the relative demand for skilled labour are positive in all these
studies, which is consistent with SBTC – both in its exogenous and trade-induced
formulations – being pervasive for middle-income countries as deﬁned by Berman
and Machin (2004).
The preceding decomposition analysis has left all the main explanations of
the increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in Mexican manufacturing
25during the 1980s, namely trade liberalisation, SBTC and trade-induced SBTC,
as possible candidates. Thus, this paper next turns to the predictions of models
that incorporate all these explanations in order to design an eﬀective strategy to
identify more formally the role that each of these shocks has played in increasing
the demand for skilled labour.
Models of directed technical change ` al aAcemoglu (2002b) may explain these
results, through exogenous and trade-induced SBTC and the direct eﬀect of trade
liberalisation, but do not allow for the role of ﬁrms that are heterogeneous in terms
of their productivity. Not only do the data analysed in this paper show much ﬁrm
heterogeneity even within narrowly deﬁned industries (4-digit CMAE75, equivalent
to 4-digit SIC), but also that this distribution changes over time.
Table 5 presents the distribution of output, exports, imported M&E, royalties
paid and M&E investment and capital at book value across the whole sample of
plants in 1990, of which the last four variables are diﬀerent measures of technology
spending and upgrading. Each distribution is measured by dividing the whole
distribution of ﬁrms into deciles and then calculating the share of each decile for
each variable. The table clearly shows that for each of these variables the plants
in the tenth decile of the distribution account for at least 66 percent of the total,
with a peak for exports, where the largest 10 percent of the plants account for
over 88 percent of total manufacturing exports. This is in line with the ﬁndings
of Bernard et al. (2009) for US manufacturing ﬁrms. Of the 2413 plants in the
sample, only 29.4 percent exported in 1990, 31.5 percent engaged in direct import
of M&E from abroad, 16.9 percent both exported their products and imported
M&E and 21 percent paid royalties on licenses for technologies.
Moreover, some recent papers highlight the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity and
26Table 5: Distribution of output, exports and inputs in 1990
Decile Output Export M&E Import Royalties M&E Inv. M&E Cap.
1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
3 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002
4 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.004
5 0.019 0.004 0.011 0.018 0.010 0.009
6 0.030 0.008 0.017 0.029 0.018 0.016
7 0.046 0.013 0.032 0.045 0.033 0.029
8 0.077 0.026 0.057 0.070 0.060 0.057
9 0.145 0.063 0.126 0.136 0.135 0.123
10 0.660 0.882 0.743 0.686 0.734 0.757
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
present empirical ﬁndings in which skill and technology upgrading is mainly done
by new exporting ﬁrms, as in Bustos (2007; 2009) for Argentina and, to a smaller
extent, in Ria˜ no (2009) for the case of Mexico. The reason is that in these models
ﬁrms can only choose between two technologies, a “traditional technology” char-
acterised by high marginal costs and low ﬁxed costs and a “modern technology”
characterised by low marginal costs but high ﬁxed costs. As a country liberalises its
trade, exporting becomes more proﬁtable. Continuing exporters will continue em-
ploying the modern technology and, therefore, will not need to upgrade. However,
new exporters that were previously using the traditional technology will choose to
upgrade as they can spread the higher ﬁxed costs over a larger output.
These models are not conﬁrmed by the data used in this paper from Mexican
manufacturing plants. Table 6 shows how changes over the 1984-1990 period in
diﬀerent measures of technology spending are related to skill upgrading over the
same period and the type of exporting plant. The inclusion of 4-digit industry
dummies allows these regressions to compare plants within the same industry,
rather than across widely diﬀerent industries.
While these results are based on all available measures of technology spending,
27the rest of the paper will use mainly M&E investment and its accumulated stock.
The reason is that the data on imported M&E, which is the preferred measure of
technology spending in Ria˜ no (2009), exclude purchases of imports via other do-
mestic ﬁrms (eg. specialised importers). Moreover, the design even of domestically
produced M&E is heavily inﬂuenced by that of imported M&E and of M&E used
abroad, which domestic producers copy either under licence (for which they pay
royalties) or by making something similar. Therefore, imported M&E is impor-
tant, both in itself and as a model for local producers to copy, but it is not the
whole of the new technology story. Also, using royalties paid on licenses for new
technologies, which is the preferred measure in Bustos (2007; 2009), excludes the
possibility that some plants acquire new technologies by the simple act of buying
and investing in a new piece of M&E.
Table 6 shows that plants that upgrade technology according to the M&E
investment measure also tend to employ relatively more skilled workers, but there
seems to be no statistical diﬀerence in technology spending, independently of the
measure used, between new and continuing exporters. Firms are categorised as
new exporters if they exported in 1990 but not in 1984 and as continuing exporters
if they exported throughout the whole period. This behaviour can be explained by
a model with a continuous type of technology, as in Caselli (2010). In this model,
as a country liberalises its trade, larger ﬁrms tend to employ more skilled workers
and invest more in M&E in absolute terms, but since there are no large jumps
in technology adoption the pattern of skill and technology upgrading is similar in
relative terms across all ﬁrms.
While the above regressions are an interesting informative tool, they are just
simple correlations between technology and skill upgrading and cannot be used to
28Table 6: Skill upgrading and changes in technology spending
ΔS/U ΔS/U ΔS/U ΔM&E Inv. ΔM&E Imp. ΔRoyalties
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS (6)
ΔM&E Investment 0.023





Continuing Exporters -1.036 -0.327 0.158
(0.857) (0.404) (0.117)
New Exporters -0.436 -0.031 0.018
(0.413) (0.118) (0.068)
Export Quitters -3.247 1.370 0.069
(3.374) (1.342) (0.117)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2407 2034 2405 2407 2034 2405
R-squared 0.066 0.060 0.064 0.088 0.010 0.054
Notes: Omitted category is “Never Exporters”, i.e. ﬁrms that never exported between 1984 and
1990. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate
coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
assess causality. Also, they do not show how trade liberalisation may have aﬀected
the relationship between technology and skill upgrading and how this has aﬀected
relative skilled wages. Thus, the next section will lay out an empirical strategy
that will be used to answer these questions and, in particular, to understand the
role of each possible explanation in the increase in the relative demand for skilled
labour.
5 Identiﬁcation strategy and econometric speciﬁcation
To establish a causal link between trade liberalisation, SBTC and wages, it is
essential to deal with endogeneity issues because, at the same time as ﬁrms set
workers’ wages, they also decide how many of them to employ and of what type,
and how much M&E to install. This implies that the within-sector variance of
29the equipment-labour ratio, a proxy for SBTC, suggested by Leonardi (2007),
is an endogenous variable in this context. Moreover, Caselli (2010) shows that
increases in this variance can be associated with other changes not related to
SBTC.6 Therefore, it is necessary to design an identiﬁcation strategy based on the
theoretical framework in Caselli (2010).
Caselli (2010) shows that, in a small country that imports its M&E, changes
in the exogenous international price of M&E and in variable trade costs levied on
them aﬀect the price of M&E, and, in turn, this aﬀects the demand for this input
as well as for skilled and unskilled labour. It also shows that changes in the price
of M&E aﬀect the within-industry variance of the ratio between M&E and labour,
the proxy for SBTC. Even though the within-industry variance of the equipment-
labour ratio changes for reasons other than SBTC, the use of the price of M&E
as an instrument for this variable makes it possible to study the eﬀect of both
exogenous and trade-induced SBTC on wages. While Caselli (2010) models M&E
as an intermediate good for modelling purposes, this paper mainly treats it as a
capital good. This diﬀerence does not seem to change the main arguments, except
that the process of technology adoption takes longer when M&E is modelled as a
capital good.
The intuition behind the use of the within-industry dispersion of the capital-
labour ratio and other similar ratios as a measure of SBTC follows from Caselli
(1999), Acemoglu (2003) and Leonardi (2007). These papers argue that more
eﬃcient ﬁrms that employ relatively more skilled workers are favoured in absolute
terms by technological developments biased towards skilled workers and, therefore,
6More speciﬁcally, Caselli (2010) uses the variance of the ratio between imported M&E and
unskilled labour because it assumes a simple relationship between M&E and skilled labour in
order to keep the model more tractable.
30in response to SBTC, they will increase their demand for skilled labour and capital
by more. This pushes the low-productivity ﬁrms out of the domestic market and,
as capital moves towards larger ﬁrms, the within-industry variance of the capital-
labour ratio increases. Caselli (2010) extends this idea to show that trade policy
can also aﬀect the within-industry dispersion of the equipment-labour ratio, which
is the basis of the empirical investigation in this paper. This implies that trade
policy could have two eﬀects on wages. The ﬁrst eﬀect is through changes in
output prices and average productivity of ﬁrms, as identiﬁed by Bernard et al.
(2007), which can be analysed with the use of tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods. The
other eﬀect is through changes in the demand for M&E and technologies, which
tend to favour skilled labour and, thus, aﬀect wages further. The second eﬀect can
be analysed with the use of tariﬀ rates on inputs.
The identiﬁcation strategy also relies on the use of the price of M&E in the
US as an instrument for SBTC, following the arguments by Krusell et al. (2000)
and Leonardi (2007). When the price of M&E decreases in the US exogenously,
due for example to the information technology ‘revolution’, the same is likely to
happen to the price of M&E in Mexico because it relies on imports of M&E from
the US. In turn, the decrease in the price of M&E increases the demand for it and,
assuming that M&E is more complementary with skilled than unskilled workers,
leads to SBTC, not only in the US but in Mexico too. Moreover, this paper takes
into account trade-induced SBTC by allowing the price of M&E in Mexico to be
aﬀected by trade policy. While Krusell et al. (2000) and Leonardi (2007) suggest
the use of the price of M&E relative to the price of structures to identify SBTC,
the model in Caselli (2010) makes use simply of the price of M&E. In the presence
of inﬂation, the price of M&E needs to to be deﬂated by the consumer price index,
31which is the relative price of M&E used in this paper. This second measure of price
for M&E is also preferred because it is the only one readily available for Mexico.
In order to implement an IV approach for SBTC, the instrument, i.e. the price
of M&E, needs to be both informative and valid. For an instrument to be in-
formative, what is required is that it is correlated with the endogenous variables.
As will be seen in the next section, this is the case since regressions with ﬁxed
eﬀects for the 46 3-digit manufacturing sectors show a statistically signiﬁcant re-
lationship between the relative price of M&E in the US and the relative price of
M&E in Mexico and, in turn, between the predicted values of the latter and the
within-industry variance in equipment-labour ratios. However, for the instrument
to be valid, it must also be uncorrelated with the residual in the main equation
determining wages. Not only does the theory suggests the validity of the instru-
ment but it also seems unlikely that changes in the price of M&E in the US have
any impact on wages in Mexico other than through changes in the price of M&E.
Moreover, considering that Leonardi (2007) argued that it is a valid instrument
for the within-industry variance of capital-labour ratios in US manufacturing, it
is likely to be an even more valid instrument for the within-industry variance of
equipment-labour ratios in Mexican manufacturing.
Two further assumptions are needed for the identiﬁcation strategy to work,
i.e. to identify the eﬀects of openness and SBTC on real and relative wages by
examining changes between industries over time. First, trade policy needs to be
exogenous. As explained in section 2, it seems to be the case that the liberalisation
process of the 1980s was caused by external factors following the 1982’s debt crisis
and its aim was to eliminate peaks in trade barriers and eventually to lower them
in order to make them also more uniform. This meant that those sectors that were
32more protected saw the largest declines in tariﬀs (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).
The second necessary assumption is that workers do not move freely across
sectors and, if they do so, they tend to do so randomly, while they can still move
across ﬁrms within the same sector. The reason why this assumption is needed
is that otherwise workers would move to those industries where wages increase
most, which would make it impossible to detect the eﬀects of trade liberalisation
and SBTC on wages since these eﬀects are identiﬁed by changes at the industry
level over time. There are several reasons why workers can move more easily across
ﬁrms within industries than across industries. Labour legislation as well as housing
and family ties can severely limit the possibility of labour mobility across sectors
in the short and medium run (Goh and Javorcik, 2007). Even in the presence of
these constraints, workers are still able to move across ﬁrms within industries if
sectors are geographically clustered, since all ﬁrms belonging to any given industry
are located close to each other, or if workers are required to have industry-speciﬁc
skills, since it takes time and money to acquire the skills needed in a particular
sector. The descriptive evidence provided in the previous section seems to conﬁrm
this short-run labour immobility as it shows that a high percentage of the changes
in the relative demand for skilled labour are within industries rather than across
them over the 1984-1990 period.
The identiﬁcation strategy in this paper is based on an instrument, the relative
price of M&E in the US, which varies across industries at 3-digit level, but is the
same for all plants within an industry. The information available on tariﬀ rates
on ﬁnal good and inputs is also such that these vary at the 3-digit industry level.
This implies that it is natural to ﬁrstly analyse changes in relative and real wages
at the 3-digit industry level using the instrumented within-industry variance of
33the equipment-labour ratio and tariﬀ rates as controls. However, the paper also
provides results based on regressing real and relative wages at the plant level on
both plant- and industry-level variables. In these regressions, it is possible to study
the impact of SBTC on wages by including both the instrumented within-industry
variance of the equipment-labour ratio and more standard plant-level measures of
SBTC, such as royalties paid on new technologies and M&E imports (see Chennells
and Van Reenen, 1999). When using plant-level measures of SBTC, the fact that
the unit of observation in the dataset is a plant rather than a ﬁrm poses problems
of identiﬁcation because ﬁrms may re-organise production among the plants they
own.
At the industry level, the set of equations to be estimated is:
lnqi,t = α0 + α1 lnzi,t + α2 ln(1 + ni,t)+yt + μi + vi,t (3)
lnci,t = β0 + β1 ln ˆ qi,t + yt + νi + υi,t (4)





wu,i,t. The last equation (5) diﬀers slightly when applied to the
real wages of skilled and unskilled workers:




In this econometric model, the ﬁrst two stages (equations (3) and (4)) are based
on regressing the within-industry variance of the equipment-labour ratio, c,w h i c h
34is the proxy for SBTC, on the predicted values obtained from a regression of the
relative price of M&E in Mexico, q, on the relative price of M&E in the US, z,a n d
on the tariﬀ rates on inputs, n. The variables in these regressions are in natural
logs since the ﬁrst equation follows from q = z·(1+n), which is easily transformed
into lnq =l nz +l n ( 1+n). In the last stage, an unlogged speciﬁcation seems to
ﬁt the data best.
In the industry-level panel regressions, the dependent variables in the last stage
(equations (5) and (6)) are the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, ωi,t,a n dr e a l
wages of both skilled and unskilled workers, wj,i,t/¯ pj,t for j = s,u,w h e r es denotes
skilled workers, u unskilled workers, i industries (ramas)a n dt year.
The independent variables in the last stage are trade liberalisation, o,m e a -
sured by sector-speciﬁc production-weighted average tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods,
and SBTC, c, proxied by the predicted intra-industry dispersion of the equipment-
labour ratio for industry i at time t. This is obtained from the predicted values of
the second stage regression.
Other controls need to be included in the analysis, which may also have diﬀering
eﬀects depending on whether skilled or unskilled wages are analysed. Goh and
Javorcik (2007) show the importance of including an indicator of the amount
of competition among ﬁrms in a speciﬁc sector, as measured by the normalised
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, h. It is arguable that, in a speciﬁc-factors model,
where one or both types of labour are imperfectly mobile across sectors, ﬁrms that
have large market power in a speciﬁc sector might also have large market power
in the acquisition of the speciﬁc inputs required for that sector, such as speciﬁc
labour, with a direct eﬀect on wages. It is also likely that this eﬀect will be
inﬂuenced by the bargaining power that workers have in that sector, which can be
35measured by the degree of unionisation in each sector, u, because any monopoly
rent will need to be shared between a ﬁrm and its workers, which will have an
eﬀect on wages. The degree of unionisation is also a proxy for labour market
conditions and the possible diﬃculties in hiring and ﬁring workers, which also
have a direct eﬀect on wages (Fairris and Levine, 2004). All regressions include
time dummies to control for economy-wide changes that also have aﬀected wages.
Among these economy-wide changes there are not only exchange rate movements
and minimum wage legislation, but also additional eﬀects of trade liberalisation
and SBTC that cannot be identiﬁed using the present strategy due to some labour
mobility. Therefore, the eﬀects of trade liberalisation and SBTC found in the next
section are likely to be a lower bound.
The above set of equations will be estimated by means of two-stage least squares
(i.e. predicted values from the initial stage are used as regressors in the following
stage instead of the actual values of the endogenous variables) extended to tradi-
tional panel data estimators, such as pooled OLS, random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects.
At the ﬁrm level, the following equations are estimated for relative and real
wages:
ωk,i,t = γ0 + γ1ωk,i,t−1 + γ2 lnˆ ck,i,t + γ3oi,t + γ4li,t + γ5mk,i,t + yt + ηk +  k,t (7)
rwk,j,i,t = γ0 + γ1rwk,j,i,t−1 + γ2lnˆ ck,i,t + γ3oi,t + γ4li,t + γ5mk,i,t + yt + ηk +  k,t.
(8)
In these ﬁrm-level panel regressions, the dependent variables are the same
as in the industry-level regressions. As mentioned earlier, these regressions use
36additional measures for SBTC, c. The industry-level proxy for SBTC will be
the within-industry variance of the equipment-labour ratio, while the ﬁrm-level
proxies for SBTC will be royalties paid on new technologies and M&E imports.
The within-industry variance of the equipment-labour ratio is obtained from the
predicted values of the ﬁrst two stages as with the industry-level panel regressions.
Tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods, o, account for trade liberalisation in the same way
as in the industry-level regressions. The other industry-level regressors (l), i.e. the
normalised Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index and the degree of unionisation, are also
included in these regressions. Regarding ﬁrm-level controls (m) to be included, the
literature review by Chennells and Van Reenen (1999) suggests several variables.
These will be the lagged dependent variable, dummies for ﬁrms’ size based on
total employment, the ratio of total capital to labour, the share of output of
each ﬁrm in its 3-digit industry and the value of exports. Including the lagged
dependent variable means that traditional panel data estimators are subject to
dynamic panel bias (Roodman, 2009). Given that the number of observations is
large, the preferred estimator at the ﬁrm level is system GMM.7
6 Econometric analysis
6.1 Results at the industry level
Table 7 reports the results for equations (3)-(5). The ﬁrst three columns report
the results of regressions using the basic POLS estimator while the last three
report the IV-FE regressions. The ﬁrst set of regressions is reported to provide
7The number of groups in the industry-level regressions is only 46, which is too small for
system GMM to give consistent estimates and, therefore, it is not used in the industry-level
analysis.
37a baseline even though these estimates are inconsistent. The Hausman IV test
always rejects the null hypothesis, which implies that the IV estimator is consistent.
The AR test and the Cragg-Donald statistic show that there should not be an
issue of weak instruments, although the Cragg-Donald statistic is slightly lower
than the conventionally accepted value of 10. The Breusch-Pagan LM test rejects
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, implying that IV-RE is preferred to
IV-POLS. However, the IV-RE estimator, whose results are not reported, also
appears inconsistent since the Hausman FE test rejects the null hypothesis that
the coeﬃcients of IV-RE and IV-FE are similar. Therefore, the following discussion
of the results is based on the results from the IV-FE regressions, which seem most
likely to yield consistent estimates.
The coeﬃcients for the IV-FE regressions reported in columns 4-6 are signiﬁ-
cant as a whole, as evidenced by the F statistics. In the ﬁrst stage, the dependent
variable is the relative price of M&E in Mexico. As can be seen in column 4, both
the relative price of M&E in the US and tariﬀ rates on inputs have a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the price in Mexico. This is consistent with both intuition
and theory given that most of the technology in Mexico either comes from the
US in the form of imported M&E or is produced locally based on the design of
models from the US. The size of the coeﬃcients is easily interpretable since these
regressions include two-way ﬁxed eﬀects and all the variables are in natural logs.
If the relative price of M&E in the US decreased by about 1 percent or tariﬀ rates
on inputs went down by about 4 percent, the relative price of M&E in Mexico
would also decrease by approximately 1 percent.
In the second stage, the dependent variable is the within-industry variance of
the equipment-labour ratio, a proxy for SBTC. Column 5 shows that the predicted
38Table 7: The eﬀects of trade and SBTC on wage inequality at industry level
Dep. var. lnpmex lnvarel ws/wu lnpmex lnvarel ws/wu
Estimator POLS POLS POLS FE IV-FE IV-FE
lnpus -0.10 1.06
(0.14) (0.35)   
ln(1 + tari) 0.30 0.25
(0.13)   (0.11)  
lnpmex -2.62 -9.53
(1.17)   (2.85)   
lnvarel -0.02 0.15
(0.01)   (0.08) 
taro 0.36 -0.41
(0.19)  (0.11)   
nhhi -0.53 0.69
(0.15)    (0.34)  
union 0.73 0.07
(0.14)    (0.35)
constant -0.09 -11.34 1.99 -0.30 -11.89 3.95
(0.03)    (0.29)    (0.51)    (0.07)    (0.24)    (0.97)   
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs. 276 276 276 276 276 276
R2 0.34 0.02 0.45 0.25 0.04 0.19
F statistics 32.76    0.94 21.59    106.42    3.22    117.44   
Breusch-Pagan test 454.98    594.20    372.39   
Hausman (FE test) 4.48 0.01 14069.9   
Hausman (IV test) 45.93    254.16   
AR Wald test (χ2) 13.84    3.79  
Cragg-Donald stat. 7.40 8.37
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate
coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
values for the relative price of M&E in Mexico from the ﬁrst stage have a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on this variance and that its size is such that a decrease of
1 percent in the relative price of M&E leads to an increase in the within-industry
variance of the equipment-labour ratio by 9.5 percent. This is consistent with the
model of Caselli (2010) where it is argued that as the price of M&E decreases,
due to exogenous technical progress abroad or a decline in tariﬀs, the demand
for M&E by more eﬃcient increases and, due to its complementarity, so does the
relative demand for skilled workers. This shows up in the data as an increase in the
39within-industry variance of the equipment-labour ratio, which is used as a proxy
for SBTC
In the last stage, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages (wi) is regressed on tariﬀ
rates on ﬁnal goods and the predicted values from the second stage, which represent
SBTC, as well as other regressors to control for other industry characteristics.
Column 6 shows that both SBTC and trade liberalisation, i.e. lower output tariﬀs,
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the skill premium. The signiﬁcant sign on
the trade liberalisation variable implies that workers’ wages are, at least partially,
determined at the industry level and do not tend to equalise across sectors, as
under perfect labour mobility. Thus, a speciﬁc-factors model of trade ﬁts the
data better, possibly due to the short-run nature of the dataset. On the other
hand, the fact that the sign is negative implies that skilled workers gained relative
to unskilled workers following the trade liberalisation. This is possibly due to
the fact that Mexico was skill abundant relative to the world average during this
period, but it is also likely that trade liberalisation increased the relative demand
for skilled workers through rises in productivity, especially in more eﬃcient and
skill-intensive ﬁrms.
In terms of the size of the eﬀect, it is possible to calculate the “direct” eﬀect of
trade liberalisation through a decrease in tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods by 20 percent-
age points, the “induced SBTC” eﬀect through a decrease in tariﬀ rates on inputs
by 11 percentage points, which together match the extent of trade liberalisation
occurred in Mexico between 1985 and 1990, and the eﬀect of exogenous SBTC
measured by the decrease by 0.006 points in the relative price of M&E in the US.
The combined eﬀect of these three shocks can explain about one quarter of the
0.7 points by which the skill premium increased during this period. While most of
40the overall eﬀect is due to exogenous and trade-induced SBTC, trade liberalisation
for ﬁnal goods also plays a role. These results conﬁrm the theoretical ﬁndings in
Caselli (2010).
Regarding the other controls, a decrease in overall competition, i.e. an increase
in the HHI, seems to have increased wage inequality, although by a small amount.
Finally, the year dummies, also contribute signiﬁcantly to the large increase in
the skill premium since they show that relative wages on average increased by
0.5 points between 1985 and 1990. This may be due, among other things, to the
decrease in the real value of the minimum wage (Bosch and Manacorda, 2010).
However, it may also be due to the additional eﬀects of trade liberalisation and
SBTC that cannot be identiﬁed using the present strategy due to some labour
mobility. Therefore, trade liberalisation and SBTC are likely to have contributed
to more than one quarter of the increase in the skill premium observed in Mexico
during 1984-1990.
Table 8 reports the results of the regressions for skilled and unskilled real wages.
In these regressions, equation (5) is replaced by equation (6) in the last stage and
thus only the estimates from the last stage are reported. Two interesting results
are revealed by these regressions. First, the instrumented within-industry variance
in the equipment-labour ratio is signiﬁcant only in the equation for skilled wages
– and it is the only signiﬁcant variable besides the year dummies. Therefore,
SBTC has a positive eﬀect on skilled wages as it leads to higher demand for skilled
workers.
Second, it seems that this econometric model cannot explain changes in un-
skilled wages over this period, since only the year dummies are signiﬁcant in the
41Table 8: The eﬀects of trade and SBTC on skilled and unskilled wages at industry
level
Dep. var. ws ws wu wu
Estimator POLS IV-FE POLS IV-FE
lnvarel 2.92 10.81 2.01 -1.62
(0.97)    (6.06)  (0.43)   (2.27)
taro 15.61 -0.59 2.10 1.07
(15.81) (9.75) (7.32) (2.86)
nhhi -29.72 4.09 -2.50 -14.77
(13.59)   (22.84) (5.55) (9.03)
union 65.22 30.34 15.16 1.36
(15.98)    (23.63) (7.16)   (9.35)
constant 116.99 208.76 73.31 34.22
(13.91)    (69.32)    (6.36)    (25.97)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
No. obs. 276 276 276 276
R2 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.17
F statistics 9.51    29.10    15.62    54.06   
Breusch-Pagan LM test 503.92    539.71   
Hausman (FE test) 238.03    12.96   
Hausman (IV test) 21.71    0.25
AR Wald test 4.53   0.32
Cragg-Donald statistic 8.37 8.37
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate
coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
last regression as they show a decrease in average unskilled real wages during 1985-
1990. This could be due to the fact that while skilled workers do not move perfectly
across sectors (one of the assumptions necessary for the identiﬁcation strategy used
here) because they possess both general and sector-speciﬁc skills, unskilled workers
are more mobile across sectors. Therefore, diﬀerences in unskilled real wages across
sectors simply reﬂect some constant compensating diﬀerentials, while changes over
time reﬂect economy-wide trends that are picked up by time dummies. This is con-
sistent with the previous evidence pointing towards a speciﬁc-factor model. It also
seems to be consistent with some of the ﬁndings by Cragg and Epelbaum (1996).
426.2 Results at the ﬁrm level
Having analysed the eﬀects of SBTC and trade liberalisation on relative and real
wages at the industry level, the following section moves on to the econometric
analysis at the ﬁrm level. The sample used is smaller because information on
exports and M&E imports are only available from 1986 onwards, but additional
regressions that exclude these variables and include a larger sample do not show
any qualitative diﬀerence in the results. Table 9 shows ﬁve regressions where
the dependent variable is the skill premium at the ﬁrm level. Three diﬀerent
proxies for SBTC are used, i.e. the instrumented within-industry variance of the
equipment-labour ratio, royalties paid on technology and M&E imports. Tariﬀ
rates on ﬁnal goods at the industry level are also included. The other controls
are divided between ﬁrm-level and industry-level variables. The estimator applied
in all the regressions is system GMM, and thus the only diﬀerence among these
regressions are the variables used to proxy for SBTC.
The Wald tests show that all regressions are signiﬁcant as a whole, while the
AR(1) and AR(2), the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation of the residuals,
detect only ﬁrst order serial correlation and reject the hypothesis of higher-order
serial correlation. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which is not
reported, is failed. It tests the overall validity of the GMM instruments where the
null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with some set of residuals.
In all the regressions, the null hypothesis is always rejected. However the failure of
this test is not worrisome, as noted by Meschi et al. (2009), because it is prone to
weakness (Roodman, 2009) and it tends to become more signiﬁcant as the number
of observations grows large (Meschi et al., 2009), as in this analysis.
43Table 9: The eﬀects of trade and SBTC on wage inequality at ﬁrm level
Dep. var. ws/wu ws/wu ws/wu ws/wu ws/wu
SBTC proxies
lnvarel 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
royalties 0.06 0.07 0.07




wi(−1) 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
(0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
size (10-49 workers) 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.14
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
size (50-99 workers) 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31
(0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)   
size (≥ 100 workers) 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.40
(0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)   
kl 0.79 0.81 0.98 0.64 0.66
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57)  (0.57) (0.57)
soutput 0.50 0.23 0.18 0.51 0.50
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34)
exports -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry-level variables
taro -0.09 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07)
nhhi -0.18 0.59 0.55 -0.19 -0.17
(0.28) (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.28) (0.28)
union -0.05 0.14 0.12 -0.03 -0.02
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
constant 0.81 0.52 0.53 0.80 0.79
(0.12)    (0.10)    (0.10)    (0.12)    (0.12)   
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs. 10070 10070 10070 10070 10070
Wald test 8418.35    8456.13    8352.84    8544.27    8559.31   
AR(1) -28.61    -28.31    -28.47    -28.53    -28.55   
AR(2) -1.19 -1.18 -1.19 -1.16 -1.14
Notes: The dependent variable is the skill premium in all regressions. Robust standard errors
are shown in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
The ﬁrst three rows show the coeﬃcients on the variables that proxy SBTC. In
the three regressions where it is included, the log of the within-industry variance
of the equipment-labour ratio is always positive and signiﬁcant, which conﬁrms
44the industry-level result that SBTC leads to an increase in the skill premium,
although the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is now smaller. Royalties paid for the
use of licensed technologies are also always positive and signiﬁcant, although only
at the 10% level when they are included on their own. The magnitude is such
that an increase in royalties spending by one standard deviation in 1990 increases
the skill premium by 0.02. While this may seem small, it is important to no-
tice that the diﬀerence between minimum and maximum spending on royalties is
about 30 standard deviations. Both the log of the within-industry variance of the
equipment-labour ratio and spending on royalties remain positive and signiﬁcant
when added together and in conjunction with M&E imports, which have a positive
sign but are never signiﬁcant. This indicates that ﬁrms in industries in which the
relative price of M&E has decreased pay higher relative skilled wages, as in Caselli
(2010), but within all industries ﬁrms that spend more on technology also pay
even higher relative skilled wages. This seems to show that spending on M&E and
spending on royalties for the use of licensed technologies are ways to invest in dif-
ferent types of technology. The next set of regressions, with skilled and unskilled
wages as dependent variables, sheds more light on this issue.
Regarding the other variables, the lagged skill premium is always positive and
signiﬁcant and the size dummies indicate that larger ﬁrms pay higher relative
skilled wages, even after controlling for the capital-labour ratio, the share of output
in the 3-digit industry and exports. Of the industry-level variables, only the tariﬀ
rate on ﬁnal goods is signiﬁcant, although only at the 10% level and only in those
speciﬁcations where the log of the within-industry variance of the equipment-
labour ratio is not included. The sign is always negative, which agrees with the
results at the industry level that liberalisation of tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods leads
45to an increase in the skill premium.
Table 10 shows six regressions, in which the dependent variable is either real
skilled wages (ﬁrst three columns) or real unskilled wages (last three columns). As
with the regressions for the skill premium, each regression includes one of three
diﬀerent proxies for SBTC and tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods at the industry level
as well as all other ﬁrm- and industry-level controls. In all the regressions, the
estimator used is system GMM.
The Wald tests show that all regressions are signiﬁcant as a whole. In the
ﬁrst three regressions, in which the dependent variable is real skilled wages, the
AR(1) and AR(2) tests detect only ﬁrst-order serial correlation and reject the
hypothesis of serial correlation of higher order. In the last three regressions, in
which the dependent variable is real unskilled wages, these tests detect both ﬁrst-
and second-order serial correlation, but reject serial correlation of higher order.
Hence, the system GMM estimator was implemented by using second, third and
fourth lags of the dependent variable as instruments (Meschi et al., 2009). The
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is always rejected, but, as argued in the
discussion of the regressions for the skill premium, the failure of this test is not
worrisome.
Starting from the regressions for real skilled wages, the variables proxying for
SBTC are all positive and signiﬁcant, which conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the industry-
level regressions. In particular, ﬁrms that import M&E also pay higher real skilled
wages, which can be caused by the fact that skilled workers and M&E are com-
plementary in production, as in the model of Caselli (2010). However, the size
of the eﬀect is much smaller than in the case of spending on royalties, possibly
46Table 10: The eﬀects of trade and SBTC on skilled and unskilled wages at ﬁrm
level
Dep. var. ws ws ws wu wu wu
SBTC proxies
lnvarel 0.80 -0.70
(0.24)    (0.10)   
royalties 23.22 6.87
(1.32)    (0.55)   
eimp 1.13 -2.06
(0.51)   (0.41)   
Firm-level variables
ws(−1) 0.10 0.11 0.10
(0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
wu(−1) 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
size (10-49 l) 21.71 21.45 21.26 3.00 5.48 4.68
(3.71)    (3.72)    (3.71)    (2.01) (2.01)    (2.02)  
size (50-99 l) 34.43 33.82 33.82 -1.54 -0.71 -1.15
(3.59)    (3.60)    (3.59)    (1.98) (1.97) (1.98)
size (≥ 100 l) 45.35 45.24 44.93 5.65 2.59 3.24
(3.54)    (3.54)    (3.53)    (1.89)    (1.89) (1.90) 
kl 219.22 218.30 230.74 101.67 104.45 106.69
(22.22)    (22.15)    (22.02)    (9.15)    (9.06)    (9.17)   
soutput 261.22 257.45 275.23 69.69 80.15 86.32
(15.59)    (15.35)    (15.27)    (5.21)    (5.21)    (5.19)   
exports 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.32 0.36
(0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)   
Industry-level variables
taro -28.46 -26.71 -27.68 -18.38 -15.90 -16.35
(2.64)    (2.62)    (2.62)    (1.12)    (1.12)    (1.13)   
nhhi -78.83 -82.12 -83.30 0.21 -31.93 -27.10
(6.08)    (5.96)    (5.98)    (4.80) (5.51)    (5.51)   
union 68.18 66.96 68.15 24.89 8.00 8.87
(2.57)    (2.56)    (2.55)    (1.64)    (2.24)    (2.27)   
constant 65.47 56.17 56.64 26.60 41.28 40.87
(4.42)    (3.51)    (3.50)    (2.26)    (1.97)    (1.99)   
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs. 10070 10070 1070 10070 10070 10070
Wald test 6075.96    6737.60    6285.58    4922.47    4355.90    4108.63   
AR(1) -21.11    -21.28    -21.17    -19.49    -19.62    -19.93   
AR(2) -0.81 -0.62 -0.80 -2.71    -2.73    -2.52   
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate
coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
47highlighting the fact that imported M&E does not take into account that ﬁrms can
purchase M&E from other domestic ﬁrms acting as importers or from domestic
producers copying foreign or imported designs.
An interesting pattern can be observed in the regressions for real unskilled
wages. While all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, those on the log of the within-industry
variance of the equipment-labour ratio and on M&E imports are negative and that
on spending on royalties for technology licenses is positive. Combined with the
other results, this seems to suggest that M&E and royalties for technology licenses
represent spending on diﬀerent types of technology. In particular, M&E seems to
be a technology that is complementary with skilled labour and a substitute for
unskilled labour. Expenses on royalties seem to be a technology that is either
complementary with both, although to diﬀerent degrees, or more generally that
increases the productivity of both types of labour.
Regarding the “direct” eﬀect of trade liberalisation, ﬁrms in industries that
face a larger decrease in tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods pay higher real skilled and
unskilled wages, although the size of the coeﬃcient is statistically larger for real
skilled wages. This is consistent with the hypothesis that in this period Mexico
was relatively skill abundant and, therefore, skilled workers would be favoured by
a trade liberalisation. Moreover, it agrees with the hypothesis that trade liberal-
isation increases ﬁrms’ average productivity, which favours all workers, although
particularly skilled workers.
The other variables suggest that, as predicted, it is important to add lagged
dependent variables for both skilled and unskilled wages. Larger ﬁrms pay higher
real skilled wages, but the evidence is less clear-cut for real unskilled wages. The
reason could be that unskilled workers have lower bargaining power as they can be
48more easily replaced. Firms with more capital per worker, that have a larger share
of output in their 3-digit industry and that export also pay higher real skilled and
unskilled wages.
6.3 Robustness checks
This section presents some robustness checks for the results presented above. Ex-
amining ﬁgure 3 discussed above and ﬁgures 4 and 5 in the Appendix, there are
a few observations that are more likely to have contributed to the increase in the
dispersion of wages across sectors. However, eliminating these few odd observa-
tions does not alter the results signiﬁcantly. More worrisome is the possibility that
wages at the sectoral level changed mainly due to a few outlier ﬁrms. In order to
investigate the potential role of within-sector wage dispersion across ﬁrms, table
11 shows the same type of regressions already presented in tables 7 and 8, but it
takes the median wage for each sector rather than the mean wage since the median
is not aﬀected by outliers. The table only shows the estimates of the last-stage
regressions using ﬁxed eﬀects.
None of the signs of the coeﬃcients change, compared to those estimated using
mean sectoral wages, but there are still a few notable diﬀerences. While SBTC
has a larger positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on relative skilled wages, it no longer
aﬀects real skilled wages. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient on tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal
goods is still negative in the regression for relative wages although not signiﬁcant,
but it now becomes signiﬁcant in the regression for real skilled wages. As before,
SBTC and trade liberalisation do not seem to aﬀect real unskilled wages, while
less competition and more unionisation appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Even
though the results conﬁrm partially the role that SBTC and trade liberalisation
49Table 11: The eﬀects of trade and SBTC on median relative and real wages at
industry level
Dep. var. ws/wu ws wu
lnvarel 0.21 0.08 -0.82
(0.09)   (5.61) (2.12)
taro -0.13 -13.67 0.94
(0.12) (7.07)   (2.67)
nhhi 0.17 23.42 -94.05
(0.37) (22.33) (8.45)   
union 0.33 7.85 18.37
(0.38) (23.14) (8.75)  
constant 4.35 104.30 42.42
(1.05)    (64.25) (24.30) 
Year dummies yes yes yes
No. obs. 276 276 276
R2 0.18 0.05 0.10
F statistics 65.21    18.48    72.16   
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate
coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
had in wage determination in Mexico during 1984-1990, they also show that these
shocks had non-trivial eﬀects on the dispersion of wages within each sector, as
pointed out by Leonardi (2007).
With regard to diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the results are not altered much when
the last-stage regressions are estimated in logs. In none of the regressions esti-
mated in the previous section is there a change in the signs of the coeﬃcient when
switching between the logged and unlogged speciﬁcations. In the logged speciﬁ-
cation, however, the coeﬃcient on tariﬀ rates on ﬁnal goods in the last stage of
the wage inequality regression is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while it is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the unlogged speciﬁcation.
The results provided are also robust to the use of diﬀerent regressors. In
particular, the estimates do not change signiﬁcantly when the price of M&E relative
to the price of structures is used instead of the price of M&E relative to the
50consumer price index for both the US and Mexico.
However, results at the industry level change when a diﬀerent proxy for SBTC
is used, as in the ﬁrm-level regressions, with the caveat that these additional
regressions can only describe correlations and not causal relationships because
both M&E imports and royalties spending for the use of licensed technologies are
endogenous at the industry level. While M&E imports are not signiﬁcant in any of
the regressions and their inclusion does not alter the other estimates, the inclusion
of royalties spending for technology licenses makes insigniﬁcant the estimate of
the predicted values of the within-industry variance of the equipment-labour ratio.
The coeﬃcient on royalties is positive and signiﬁcant in all the regressions (both
for relative wages and for real wages), implying that sectors that spend more on
technology upgrading tend to pay higher wages, especially to skilled workers. This
conﬁrms the ﬁrm-level ﬁndings that royalties for technology licenses represent a
type of technology upgrading that is either complementary with both types of
labour, although to diﬀerent degrees, or more generally increases the productivity
of both types. However, at sectoral level, it is not possible to distinguish this
type of technology upgrading from that represented by M&E spending, which is
expected to be complementary with skilled labour and a substitute for unskilled
labour.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyses and quantiﬁes the eﬀects of SBTC, both exogenous and trade-
induced, and of liberalisation of trade in ﬁnal goods using ﬁrm-level data in Mex-
ican manufacturing from 1984 to 1990. In order to produce consistent estimates
51and to avoid possible endogeneity problems, it builds an identiﬁcation strategy
based on the model of Caselli (2010). The eﬀect of both exogenous and trade-
induced SBTC on wages, and especially on wage inequality, appears substantial.
The regressions show that trade liberalisation and changes in the relative price of
equipment in the US, which induce exogenous SBTC in Mexico, can explain about
one quarter of the increase in the skill premium during the period considered and
that most of this eﬀect is due to SBTC, although trade liberalisation for ﬁnal
goods also plays a non-trivial role.
The evidence presented is, therefore, consistent with the idea that as the price
of equipment decreases, due to exogenous technical progress abroad or a decline
in tariﬀs, the demand for it increases and, due to complementarity, so does the
relative demand for skilled workers. These results are conﬁrmed when the regres-
sions are run at the ﬁrm level and use diﬀerent ﬁrm-level proxies for SBTC. The
pattern of absolute changes in real skilled wages can also be explained by SBTC
and trade liberalisation, while the decrease in unskilled wages during this period
can be explained mainly by SBTC, though in some speciﬁcations also by trade lib-
eralisation. The evidence points towards a speciﬁc-factors model in which skilled
workers have both general and sector-speciﬁc skills.
The recent increase in economic research on trade-induced SBTC has been
conﬁned mainly to theoretical work, with the exception of Bustos (2009) for the
case of Argentina and Meschi et al. (2009) for the case of Turkey. It is hoped that
the present study of wages in Mexican manufacturing to be followed by empirical
studies of other developing countries in order to learn more about the channels
through which exogenous and trade-induced SBTC works.
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A Additional ﬁgures
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Real wages of skilled workers in 1985
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
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Real wages of unskilled workers in 1985
Source: Own calculations based on Encuesta Industrial Anual, 1984-1990, INEGI.
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